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INTRODUCTION
The United States has reached one of those rare junctures in
its political history when consensus exists between leaders in both
political parties about radical changes in federal social policy. The
Republican Congress has targeted welfare reform as one of its top
priorities in the "Contract with America,"' which Republicans
promote as a "detailed agenda for national renewal."2 Similarly,
President Clinton has pledged to "end welfare as we know it"3
through his "Work and Responsibility Act of 1994.",4
Despite promises to bring about change, both the Clinton
reform bill and the Republican Contract are precisely what they
purport not to be: a reprise of failed welfare initiatives from the
past that focus bluntly on controlling parental behavior. Past initia-
tives have been structured around social engineering efforts to
classify the poor as "deserving" or "undeserving."5 Status in a so-
1. House Republicans signed the "Contract with America" during their 1994 cam-
paigns. See Helen Dewar, Historic Session Leaves Minor Legislative Legacy; Historic
Congress's Busy Session Results in Relatively Few Laws, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1996, at
Al, A4. The Contract includes ten bills; its signees pledged to bring these bills to the
House floor within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress. HOUSE REPUBLICANS, CON-
TRACr WrTH AMERICA 8-9 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). Included in the
list is the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995),
which is the Republicans' punitive solution to "welfare dependency." See discussion infra
part M.B.
2. See CONTRACT vITH AMERICA, supra note 1, at 7.
3. Jason DeParle, From Pledge to Plan: The Campaign to End Welfare, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1994, at Al.
4. H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
5. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 37 (1991) ("[Tlhe evolution of wel-
fare policy is, in large part, the process of creating and revising the moral classifications
of the poor."); MICHAEL B. KATz, THE UNDESERVING POOR 67 (1989) (explaining how
even critics of welfare distinguished between those who "[fell] into poverty through indo-
lence and intemperance" and those who were "worthy poor"); Martha Fineman, Images
of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L. 274, 280-81, 282 ("This classification is
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cial group determined these classifications: unemployed men and
single women were responsible for their own situations and there-
fore undeserving, whereas widows with children were blameless
victims who had conformed to societal norms by marrying the
fathers of their children and therefore were deserving of assis-
tance.6 Both the Clinton reform bill and the Republican Contract
repeat this classification error by focusing on parental behavior at
the expense of a second, more positive guiding force. That force is
child welfare, and it has competed over time with policies intend-
ed to control the behavior of adults.
Policies focusing on child welfare rather than on parental
incentives have driven legislative7 and judicial8 recognition of at
least two significant national values: family preservation as a social
good and the unfairness of controlling parental behavior by pun-
ishing children. The Clinton/Republican direction of welfare re-
form, by focusing on parental behavior control, threatens to nullify
the vital progress that child-centered policy has made toward pro-
tecting the well-being of poor children. Current Democratic and
Republican welfare reform proposals cloak their indirect assaults
on poor children9 by focusing on their parents' morality and "re-
sponsibility."' 0 In their clamor to reclaim the so-called moral high
ground, both parties are guilty of hypocrisy. Their emphasis on
often based on the public's perception of whether the impoverished individual is poor
because of her personal choices . . . or as a result of forces beyond her control.").
6. KATZ, supra note 5, at 67 ("Upright widows with children and old women re-
mained the quintessential worthy poor.").
7. See infra part I.
8. See infra part II.
9. At last count 14.6 million American children, or 21.9% of the child population,
were living in poverty. THE CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S
CHILDREN YEARBOOK 2 (1994). This estimate is computed according to the Department
of Health and Human Services' (HHS) poverty line, which was $12,320 for a three-per-
son family in 1994. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 6277,
6277 (1994). For arguments that the poverty line is inaccurately low, see Kathryn Edin &
Christopher Jencks, Reforming Welfare, in RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY,
AND THE UNDERCLASS 204, 209 (Christopher Jencks ed., 1992).
10. See infra Part HI. As an alternative to responsibility rhetoric, the staggering
number of poor children may be explained in part by economic and demographic chang-
es in the country since the time welfare was introduced as a national program. See
JAMES T. PATrERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY, at viii, 215, 218-23 (2d
ed. 1986). These changes in the economic landscape include women's increased participa-
tion in the work force, DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 47-49 (1988), and the re-
structuring of the economy and corresponding labor market problems, Laurence E. Lynn,
Jr., Ending Welfare Reform as We Know It, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Fall 1993, at 83,
85-87.
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"responsibility" is fundamentally irresponsible policy because it
ignores a core societal value: protecting our children." This core
value has been supported by policy developments and reinforced
by judicial decisions holding unconstitutional state public assistance
programs that punish children to influence parental behavior. The
current debate ignores this legal and political history. Current pro-
posals also would fail to achieve their purpose of affecting the
behavior of welfare recipients since they do not address the reali-
ties of being poor.1
Part I of this Note addresses the history of the welfare state
and welfare reform in the United States. This history has been
animated by the often competing goals of ensuring the welfare of
children, on the one hand, and adult behavior modification, or
socializing adults to engage in "responsible" behavior, on the
other. Part II traces the gradual establishment of child-centered
welfare policy in caselaw and demonstrates, through the example
of "child exclusion" laws, 3 that welfare reformers' current poli-
cies have a misguided legal basis and may in fact be unconstitu-
tional. Part I discusses President Clinton's welfare reform pack-
age, which includes both a "full family sanction"'4 and liberalized
"child exclusion" laws. This Part also examines the Republican
Contract With America, which outlines an even more punitive
welfare reform initiative. Part III critiques these current welfare
reform proposals and concludes that they are founded on myth
and misconception. President Clinton and the Republican welfare
reformers head in the wrong direction by focusing on controlling
parental conduct instead of child welfare. Although the routes that
President Clinton and the Republicans want to take may be politi-
cally expedient, they threaten, in the name of "responsibility," to
eviscerate society's moral commitment to provide for children.
11. To put it another way, Professor Minow aptly asks, "[A]re single mothers on
welfare properly to be viewed as dependent people who should become economically
self-reliant, or as people upon whom children depend, and people upon whom society de-
pends to raise those children successfully?" Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers
and Their Children, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 817, 822 (1994).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 122-30.
13. "Child exclusion" laws deny additional benefits to a family when a child was
conceived after the family is receiving public assistance. The administration's proposal lib-
eralizes current law in that it does not require states to obtain a waiver from HHS to
implement "child exclusion" laws. See discussion infra part III.A.
14. A "full family sanction" throws an entire family off welfare when a parent fails
to comply with behavioral requirements. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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This moral commitment has evolved through welfare policies,
legislation, and judicial holdings regarding children's rights under
welfare law. 5
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WELFARE AS A MORAL
COMMITMENT TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
Debates about welfare reform have often drawn distinctions
between the "deserving" and the "undeserving" poor.16 Through-
out the political history of welfare, children traditionally have been
deemed the most innocent poor, and therefore the most "deserv-
ing" of public assistance. Thus, the major federal transfer pro-
grams for the poor focus on providing aid to children, either
through monetary assistance such as Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC), or through in-kind benefits, such as Food
Stamps and housing subsidies. Although welfare policy first aimed
to remove poor children from their families, policymakers and
advocates for the poor eventually came to a consensus that wel-
fare should aim to keep children with their parents. This lesson
was learned early in the twentieth century. 7 Thus policymakers
have constructed a welfare system that provides parents with aid,
whether or not they are morally "deserving" by the standards of
the rest of society, in order to reach their needy children.
A. An Evolving Recognition That Children Should Remain with
Their Families: The Origins of Welfare for Children
Early nineteenth-century programs for the poor featured work
requirements, local administration and stigmatization. 8 First, as-
sistance was conditioned on employment or participation in work
programs.19 Second, state welfare statutes gave complete discre-
tion to local administrators, prescribing "neither eligibility nor bud-
get."'  Third, poorhouses operated as the primary relief mech-
anism at the time, depriving the destitute of liberty and segregat-
15. See infra parts I & II.
16. See supra note 5.
17. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
18. Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children:
The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE- 457,
467-70 (1987-88).
19. Id. at 469.
20. Id. at 470.
1304 [Vol. 45:1301
CHILD WELFARE OR RHETORIC?
ing them from the rest of society.2 Poverty policy slowly recog-
nized the failures of these features, at least as they related to the
welfare of the children in poor families. The "core values of the
AFDC program" subsequently emerged: children are better off in
their own homes than in public custody; people receiving welfare
should be treated equitably; and "children should not be penalized
for the behavior of their parents."2
Nineteenth-century policymakers classified the poor "in terms
of moral blameworthiness."'  Such categorizing can be attributed
in part to the post-Civil War environment, in which indigent war
veterans were classified separately from other groups of the
poor.24 Classification coincided with the institutional movement,
which introduced orphanages to shelter children who did not have
living parents or whose parents were too destitute to provide for
them.25
By the turn of the twentieth century, social programs for
children had fully bifurcated along lines of parental status. Or-
phaned and disabled children were the "deserving" poor, while
children in poor families were labeled as "undeserving."'26 Policy-
makers believed that providing poor children with too much public
assistance would interfere with their parents' work incentives.27
The nineteenth-century policy emphasis on who "deserved" the
state's assistance and who did not contrasts sharply with the goal
of family preservation that emerged during the Progressive Era.
The emergence of the Child Saving Movement during the
middle of the nineteenth century initially contributed to welfare
policies that encouraged breaking up poor families. Primarily an
elite-to-middle class women's movement, the Child Savers original-
ly worked to remove poor children from their "bad" home envi-
21. Id. at 468.
22. Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
"Reforn," 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 741, 743 n.16 (1993). These "core values" also hold
that reductions in benefits should be accompanied by fair process, and that administration
of welfare should be consistent across states and regions. Id.
23. Handler, supra note 18, at 470.
24. See THEDA SKOPCOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 102-03 (1992).
25. See generally SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE RE-
FORM IN THE PROGRESSIvE ERA 61-87 (1982) (describing institutional care).
26. See Handler, supra note 18, at 471-72.
27. See Joel F. Handler, Two Years and You're Out, 26 CONN. L. REV. 857, 857
(1994) ("The overriding fear was that giving aid indiscriminately would destroy the incen-
tive to work ....").
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ronments.' Eventually, the Child Savers realized the cruel reali-
ties of institutions and the value of home life to a child's long-
term well-being and took up the cause of family preservation.29
This tension persists in the current welfare reform debate.
The predecessors to AFDC, currently the program most people
are referring to when they discuss welfare, were the states'
"Mothers' Pension Programs,"3 first created in Illinois in 1911.
Social reformers promoted Mothers' Pensions because they had
come to believe in family preservation and saw the pension pro-
grams as a means to enable destitute children to remain at home,
rather than being placed in foster care.3' By 1935, every state
except Georgia and South Carolina had a pension program, or
"mother's aid law."32 Although the programs had moralistic over-
tones and condoned interference in the privacy of recipients'
lives,33 they represent an early recognition of the benefits and im-
portance of parental child-rearing.
This recognition was demonstrated best by the 1909 White
House Conference on Dependent Children, where recommenda-
tions were made to establish a Federal Children's Bureau and to
make "greater provision ... for the assistance of needy children
in their own homes. ' Eleven years after this conference, the
Committee on Dependency and Neglect reported that "some
28. See Handler, supra note 18, at 471.
29. Handler, supra note 27; see also TIFFIN, supra note 25, at 110-11:
Whereas nineteenth-century child-savers were mainly concerned with removing
children from dangerous influences, their successors in the Progressive era be-
lieved that dependency and neglect might be prevented. . . . By preserving and
reconstructing the family unit, the child-savers hoped to reduce the numbers of
dependent and neglected children in institutions and foster homes.
30. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1935) (stating that AFDC and the
Social Security Act were built on the earlier "mothers' pensions" programs).
31. WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 4 (1965) ("No child should be
deprived of his family by reason of poverty alone.") (citation omitted); GRACE ABBOTT,
FROM RELIEF TO SOCIAL SECURITY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW PUBLIC WEL-
FARE SERVICES AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION 263 (1966) (describing New Jersey's leg-
islation as an act "to promote home life for dependent children."). For a history of
Mother's Pension Programs, see BELL, supra, at 3-19; see also LINDA GORDON, PITIED
BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at
37-64 (1994); MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK 135-66 (1994); THEDA SKOPCOL,
PROTECING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN
THE UNITED STATES 424-79 (1992).
32. ABBOTT, supra note 31, at 263.
33. GORDON, supra note 31, at 45-46.
34. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILD HEALTH AND PROTECTION, PRELIMI-
NARY COMMITrEE REPORTS 500 (1930).
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220,000 needy children are living in their own homes and cared
for by their own mothers through the operation of mothers' aid
laws."'35 Although these state programs continued to scrutinize
parents' moral worthiness, keeping poor families intact had
emerged as a primary objective of national social policy.
The Children's Bureau's primary success was enactment of the
first federal welfare program, the Sheppard-Towner Act of
1921.' This Act expressed a national recognition that pregnancy
is a time of special need; the legislation provided assistance with-
out means-testing (aid not based on recipients' income) for ma-
ternal and child hygiene programs.' The current welfare reform
proposals contravene this social value, treating pregnancy as a
time of reprisal and abandonment by society, rather than a time
of special need.38
B. Family Preservation Despite "Unsuitable Homes" or Parental
Misbehavior: The Social Security Act of 1935 and Evolving AFDC
Standards
AFDC 9 emerged from the Social Security Act of 1935.'
The AFDC program, an example of "cooperative federalism,'"' is
a state-implemented program that receives federal matching funds,
subject to approval by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS).42 From its inception, the AFDC program, like
nineteenth-century reform movements, exhibited the tension be-
tween policy focused on adult behavior and policy focused on the
well-being of children. AFDC eligibility initially was state-deter-
mined. A state could "impose such... eligibility requirements-as
to means, moral character, etc.--as it [saw] fit."43 States set the
35. Id. at 501.
36. See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 31, at 167-96.
37. See, eg., GORDON, supra note 31, at 94-95.
38. See infra part III; see also infra part U.B. (discussing "child exclusion laws"
which purport to deter pregnancies).
39. Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
40. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
41. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-02 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
43. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935). Not surprisingly, state discretion
led to racial discrimination in the administration of AFDC, as "southern states [were able
to] perpetuate the same patterns of racial exclusion as they had [before enactment of a
13071996]
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level of benefits as well as the standard of need, creating wide
variations across the country. In 1939, for example, participating
states' average monthly payments ranged from $8.10 per family in
Arkansas to $61.07 per family in Massachusetts.'
Congress reacted to some of the interstate inconsistencies with
legislation. Whereas the 1935 Act demanded only that states pro-
vide funds "as far as practicable under the conditions in such
states,"'45 resulting in exclusion of more than two-thirds of eligible
dependent children in 1940,46 Congress eventually required states
to pay assistance "to all eligible individuals."'47 This provision cur-
rently prohibits the states from narrowing the categorical eligibility
requirements that the Social Security Act established.48 Congress
also reacted to the most overt discrimination against welfare fami-
lies with legislative changes designed to minimize abuse of the
benefit application process. 49 A national administrative standard
was conclusively articulated by the Flemming Rule of 1961.50 This
Rule, based on the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare's
conclusions regarding justice and children's needs, forbade states
from denying benefits to children based on moral judgments about
their family environments.51 The Flemming Rule was articulated
in a letter which provides the following direction to state agencies:
federal program]." Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 22, at 743. For a discussion of recent
"behavior modification" proposals in state welfare programs, see Lucy A. Williams, The
Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE LJ. 719
(1992).
44. PATrERSON, supra note 10, at 69.
45. Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1988).
48. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968).
49. See, eg., Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, tit. III, §§ 321(a),
402(a), 64 Stat. 477, 549 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(4) (1988)).
50. This Rule is named after the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare who
authored it, Arthur S. Flemming. Flemming stated:
I have concluded that when a needy child who otherwise fits within the Aid to
Dependent Children program of the State is denied the funds that are admit-
tedly needed to provide the basic essentials of life itself, because of the behav-
ior of his parent or other relative, the State plan imposes a condition that
bears no just relationship to the Aid to Dependent Children program. I there-
fore believe that this Department should inform the State agencies administering
Aid to Dependent Children plans that eligibility conditions with the effect de-
scribed above are not compatible with entitlement for continued Federal grants.
Letter from the Director of the Bureau of Public Assistance to State Agencies. (Jan. 17,
1961) (on file with author).
51. 1&
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A state plan for aid to dependent children may not impose an
eligibility condition that would deny assistance with respect to a
needy child on the basis that the home conditions in which the
child lives are unsuitable ... 52
The Flemming Rule represented a crucial advancement of child-
centered welfare policy over policy focused on society's notions of
moral or "responsible" parental behavior.
In addition to barring denial of benefits based on moral judg-
ments about parental behavior, policy in the 1960s expanded
AFDC to include support for children of unmarried parents and
deserted parents. "Absent father" rules, which previously had
denied AFDC benefits to families if the mother "cohabited" with
an able-bodied man, were judicially invalidated,53 and federal reg-
ulations were issued to decrease local control.54 Overall, child-fo-
cused welfare policy was gaining the upper hand, and the goal of
controlling parental behavior was being abandoned largely as inef-
fective policy.
AFDC policies in the 1980s and 1990s reopened the conflict in
welfare policy between child welfare and attempts to control pa-
rental behavior. Welfare controversy during the Reagan, Bush and
Clinton administrations has focused on the proliferation of AFDC
"waivers."55 These waivers permit states to engage in AFDC "ex-
periments" or "projects" if they obtain permission from HHS to
diverge from the basic requirement to provide assistance "to all
eligible individuals" within the state.56 Waivers are granted when
they will be "likely to assist in promoting the objectives" of the
Social Security Act, or when they conform to the Congressional
52. Id.
53. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968).
54. Handler, supra note 18, at 481. These initiatives increased the number of non-
white welfare recipients. Many scholars argue that societal attitudes toward this "new
clientele"--black, poor, female-headed households-are the impetus behind current efforts
at punitive policy change. See generally THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL,
CHAIN REACTION (1991) (arguing that the shift in political power to the right over the
last generation has intensified the view among many whites that the responsibility for the
disadvantaged lies with those afflicted); Handler, supra, at 466-67, 483 (arguing that the
welfare reform consensus is based, in part, on the notion that welfare encourages depen-
dency, which is then passed on to children of parents on welfare).
55. See, eg., Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 22; Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of
Section 1115 Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 8 (1994).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994).
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purpose of the Act." Waivers have been used by the states to
experiment in areas such as Learnfare,58 where benefits are re-
duced when parents fail to force their children to attend school.
States have also used waivers to impose family caps,59 which deny
benefits for additional children born to AFDC families whose
incomes have reached a predetermined income "cap," or limit.
These "experiments" foreshadowed the Clinton and House Repub-
lican plans' reversion to moralistic behavior control as a policy
goal that trumps conflicting child welfare concerns.
The above discussion demonstrates that AFDC standards have
long reflected the tensions between policies aimed at controlling
parental behavior and policies intended to promote child welfare.
Welfare reform debate in the 1990s also reflects a tension between
AFDC's essential purpose and the reality of the American family.
The underlying and undeniable purpose of AFDC when it was
created in 1935 was to provide financial support to needy chil-
dren.' Legislators in the 1930s believed that children were "the
most tragic victims of the depression"'" and that "[t]he heart of
any program for social security must be the child."'62 The welfare
program that grew out of this belief was based on a family
"breadwinner" model: Assistance was intended for children whose
natural "breadwinner" parent, the father, was absent.63 For this
reason, AFDC has been described as representing a "national
commitment to the idea that a mother's place is in the home. ' 64
The presence of mothers in the work force, due to either necessity
or choice, renders this model obsolete.' Perhaps this explains
57. California Welfare Rights Organization v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 497
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
58. See Handler, supra note 27, at 860; Williams, supra note 43, at 726-36.
59. See Handler, supra note 27, at 860; Williams, supra note 43, at 736-41.
60. AFDC has been described as "an afterthought, meant to aid widows with chil-
dren, such as the wives of uninsured workers killed in mine disasters." Richard P.
Nathan, The Welfare Long Shot, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1994, at C2. In 1935, 88% of the
families that received welfare were families in which the father had died. VEE BURKE,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, TIME LIMITED PROPOSALS 9 (1994).
61. H.R. REP. NO. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935).
62. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935).
63. See H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, 29-30 (1935); see also 79
CONG. REC. 5468, 5476, 5786, 5861 (1935).
64. Judith M. Gueron, Welfare and Poverty: The Elements of Reform, 11 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 113, 113 (1993) (quoting GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE 54
(1971)); see also Jared Bernstein, Rethinking Welfare Reform, DISSENT, Summer 1993, at
277 ("The initial goal was to keep both mother and child out of the work force.").
65. See, eg., Minow, supra note 11, at 826. Minow argues that working women who
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why welfare is being assaulted with such rigor today.' Because
many American families no longer fit a "breadwinner/homemaker"
model, the underlying rationale behind AFDC is no longer appli-
cable. It seems unfair to many Americans to give a subset of the
population financial support in exchange for caregiving, when
many mothers work outside the home and raise children. These
fairness concerns, however, obscure the reality of the program:
AFDC has always been intended to provide assistance to needy
children, particularly children with a missing parent.67 This funda-
mental purpose remains a viable and appropriate goal when mil-
lions of American children live in poverty.'
C. Federal Work Programs under AFDC: WIN and JOBS
The impulse to join work requirements with the provision of
public assistance has influenced welfare policymakers since the
early nineteenth century. 9 AFDC has been no exception to the
general rule that welfare and work frequently are linked together.
While work programs may make intuitive sense as sound welfare
policy because they promote job skills and work habits, work
requirements have failed to achieve their intended goals of pro-
moting family self-sufficiency and discouraging welfare "dependen-
cy." The failure has been due largely to inadequate funding. Job
training is expensive and past work programs, although implement-
ed during a time of relative generosity toward public assistance
programs, were consistently underfunded. 70
The 1960s saw implementation of federal work requirements
for AFDC families. The first program, the Work Incentive Pro-
are not on welfare differ from women adhering to welfare work requirements in a crucial
way: Only women receiving welfare benefits are forced by the government to work. In
addition, she points out that many working mothers only work part-time or part of the
year. Id. at 826-27.
66. A recent poll found that Americans rate welfare reform as a higher priority than
health care reform, although the total budget for AFDC is only $23 billion, while the
total budget for health care is $900 billion. Handler, supra note 27, at 865.
67. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 9-10 (1935) (declaring children to be
"the most tragic victims of the depression"); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 16-17
(1935) (stating that the "heart of any program for social security must be the child");
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327-30 (1968) (holding that the economic security of needy
children is the paramount interest).
68. See supra notes 9-10.
69. Handler, supra note 27, at 858.
70. See inra text accompanying notes 79-100.
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gram (WIN),7' was based on "[t]he prevailing view in Con-
gress ... that welfare undermined family stability and work incen-
tives."'72 Men had to participate in WIN, but participation for
women was voluntary.73 The program categorized participants as
"immediately employable," in need of training, or unemploy-
able.74 The unemployable group was given "special works pro-
jects," which have come to be known as "workfare," or made-up
work, in exchange for welfare benefits.75
WIN has not succeeded. First, WIN placements arguably are
not the result of WIN, but would have occurred in the absence of
the program.76 Second, although participants in WIN received
lower grants due to their work income, these savings to the gov-
ernment fell short of their associated costs.7 WIN therefore dem-
onstrates that work programs linked to welfare are more costly
than direct financial assistance.78 Third, those people who found
employment through WIN often remain dependent on welfare
because of inadequate wages.79 WIN neither ended "welfare de-
pendency" nor helped recipients to achieve self-sufficiency. For
these reasons, "[g]overnment studies of WIN uniformly conclude
that it has not achieved its objective of forcing the poor to be-
come economically independent."'
Aware of WIN's failings, Congress attempted unsuccessfully to
make WIN more effective. The Talmadge Amendments of 1971, or
WIN II,81 toughened work requirements and emphasized place-
ment in entry-level jobs over training. WIN II also failed, again
due to the costs of work programs and a lack of resources.'
71. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (1988).
72. Handler, supra note 18, at 489.
73. Id. at 490.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 489-91.
76. Id. at 490.
77. Id.
78. The average grant to an AFDC family with two children is $4,400 per year,
whereas enrollment in a work program costs about $11,400; work programs for the entire
welfare population would therefore cost approximately $15 billion per year. Jason
DeParle, Better Work Than Welfare, But What if There's Neither? N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1994, at 44.
79. See Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare & the Preservation of the Patriarchy,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1273 (1983).
80. Id. at 1273-74.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 633 (1994).
82. Handler, supra note 18, at 491.
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The Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) s3 established the only
other federal work program affiliated with AFDC. The FSA,
which had bipartisan support, includes among other things the Job
Opportunity and Basic Skills Program (JOBS). 4 By mandating
that all states implement work programs,' JOBS' creators in-
tended to change welfare from an entitlement program to a work-
based system.' Specifically, the FSA requires all mothers with
children over six years of age to work. 87 States can lower that
age with a federal waiver.'
Like WIN, JOBS has been unsuccessful. Despite the general
willingness of Congress in the 1980s to spend beyond its means,
the JOBS program has been "starved for the funding necessary to
put the reforms into practice. 8 9 Moreover, although JOBS impos-
es an obligation on some welfare mothers to work, it has been
remarkably ineffective in reducing poverty.9' The first component
of JOBS, a "labor force attachment" program that used services to
shift people quickly into work of any kind, decreased the number
of AFDC recipients by only 11%." The second, slower approach
taken by JOBS, a "human capital development" program that
83. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687
(1988)).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 682 (1988). Section 602(g)(1)(A) of the FSA also includes a child
care "guarantee," or entitlement, which is symbolically significant but has been weakened
severely by regulatory, economic and political constraints. See Ann Collins & Barbara
Reisman, Child Care Under the Family Support Act: Guarantee, Quasi-Entitlement, or
Paper Promise?, 11 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 203, 214-19 (1993).
85. Robert Moffit, Welfare Reform: An Economist's Perspective, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 126, 140 (1993).
86. Handler, supra note 18, at 483, argues that the toughening of work requirements
in the AFDC program coincided with changes in the population on welfare rolls and so-
cietal attitudes toward non-white single mothers. For an argument that the welfare debate
is linked to debates about race, and that as the country has moved to the right, the
victim has been the welfare system, see EDSALL, supra note 54.
87. Handler, supra note 18, at 502.
88. Id.
89. Joseph A. Califano, Overview: Welfare Reform, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 109,
112 (1993). Since JOBS was not funded at a level sufficient to function effectively, it is
ludicrous to believe the current budget-slashing and deficit-minded Congress, see, e.g.,
infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text, would supply the necessary funds to support
welfare-to-work programs today.
90. Gueron, supra note 64, at 117 ("In their 1980s version, welfare-to-work pro-
grams ... saved money and increased employment somewhat but did little to reduce
poverty.").
91. VEE BURKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, WELFARE RE-
FORM 9 (1995).
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encouraged skills-building and postponed employment until recip-
ients were job-ready, did not produce earnings or employment
gains for participants.' Part of the problem with JOBS is that
child care can cost nearly as much as participants' earnings. Al-
though states are supposed to provide participants with child care,
in many states the programs have not materialized.93 For exam-
ple, mothers in Dane County, Wisconsin who find full-time em-
ployment through JOBS earn an average of $6.74 per hour, or
$14,000 per year.' Day care in that area costs upwards of
$12,000 per year.95 As one journalist reports, "[i]t doesn't take a
math genius to figure out the jam that the program participants
are in.t96
WIN and JOBS demonstrate that associating AFDC with
work requirements without making a concomitant commitment to
adequate funding is neither a wise nor a successful strategy to
increase family self-sufficiency. Work requirements for AFDC
parents, if imposed without the funds necessary to see them
through, do little to promote the interests of children in AFDC
families, rarely alter recipients' "work habits," and frustrate the
purposes of both policy promoting child welfare and policy aimed
at behavior control.
II. CHILDREN'S "LEGAL RIGHT" TO WELFARE
Arguing that children have a "legal right" to welfare may be
an overstatement, because welfare benefits have yet to be declared
by the Supreme Court to be a clear legal entitlement or civil right
under the Constitution. On the occasions that the Court has con-
sidered the matter, however, it has condemned distribution
schemes which aim to affect parental behavior at the expense of
children.' In addition, although the Court has yet to declare a
"fundamental right" to welfare, it has held that, in order for wel-
fare programs to pass constitutional muster, they must supply a
rational justification for denying benefits.98 These two legal princi-
92. Id.
93. Collins & Reisman, supra note 84.
94. Ruth Coniff, Big Bad Welfare, THE PROGRESSIVE, August 1994, at 18, 21.
95. Id. at 21.
96. Id.
97. See infra part I.A.
98. Id.
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ples warrant consideration when developing welfare policy that
denies benefits to children on the basis of moral judgments about
their parents.
A. Legal Background
Commentators argue that the period from 1968 to 1981 wit-
nessed the "legalization of welfare."99 Litigation during this peri-
od resulted in several basic changes in welfare caselaw. Courts
established judicial review of administrative decisions denying
benefits,"° and states were prohibited from changing federal eli-
gibility requirements ad hoc.' The Supreme Court subjected
states' eligibility requirements to fundamental fairness standards
under the Due Process Clause;" z the government's power to con-
dition receipt of benefits upon waiver of constitutionally protected
liberties was limited;0 and equal protection analysis now prohib-
its states from setting eligibility standards based on criteria like sex
and legitimacy."°
The "legalization of welfare" established various welfare rights
for children. Courts condemned public benefits schemes that pun-
ish dependent children for their parents' conduct. The Supreme
Court first recognized in 1968 that a primary purpose of creating
the welfare state was to take care of impoverished children uncon-
ditionally. According to the Court's decision in King v. Smith,'05
states are not "free to discourage [childbirth] by the device of
absolute disqualification of needy children" from AFDC, as that
method "plainly conflicts" with the Social Security Act."6 The
99. Law, supra note 79, at 1249. In her article, Professor Law argues that welfare
preserves the patriarchy because it assumes that women should be dependent on men,
makes aid contingent upon the withdrawal of male economic support, and places a for-
mal employment requirement on welfare mothers, thereby devaluing the work of women
who stay home and care for their children.
100. Id at 1267 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)).
101. Id. at 1267-68 (citing cases collected in N. DORSEN, E'r AL, POLMCAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1328 (1979)).
102. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
103. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
104. Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
105. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
106. Id at 326-27.
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King case involved an Alabama regulation denying AFDC benefits
to families where the mother "cohabits" with an able-bodied
man."° The Court properly recognized that the "paramount goal
of AFDC" is the "protection of ... children" and therefore for-
bade administering the program through "measures that punish de-
pendent children" in order to discourage "immorality or illegitima-
cy. ,,M8
In addition to the statutory arguments that the Court used in
King, constitutional jurisprudence provides precedent for the invali-
dation of classification schemes based on parental behavior. In
Levy v. Louisiana,"° the Court held that the denial of the right
to recover for wrongful death on the basis of illegitimacy violated
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution.
The Court concluded that "it is invidious to discriminate against
[illegitimate children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of
theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the moth-
er."" 0 The rationale of Levy extends easily to welfare rights for
children. For example, in his concurrence in King, Justice Douglas
made a potent constitutional argument for striking down the Ala-
bama law that disqualified children whose mothers cohabited from
receiving welfare benefits. Justice Douglas found the Alabama law
unconstitutional because "the immorality of the mother has no
rational connection with the need of her children under any wel-
fare program."'
Other Supreme Court decisions have recognized the
impermissibility of penalizing children for their parents' behavior,
even as these cases have limited the constitutionalization of certain
substantive rights that these children have claimed. In Plyler v.
Doe,"' for example, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas
statute that withheld funds for the education of the children of
illegal immigrants. Although children are not a "suspect class" and
education is not a "fundamental right," thereby removing the
statute from "compelling interest" analysis, the Court found the
children's inability to affect their parents' behavior or their own
107. Id. at 314.
108. 1d at 325.
109. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
110. Id. at 72.
111. 392 U.S. at 336.
112. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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illegal alien status legally significant:" 3 "Even if the state found
it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their
children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct
against his children does not comport with fundamental concep-
tions of justice.""' 4
The Plyler court held that the Texas statute violated the
Equal Protection clause based on a rational relationship test,"5
under which the means of allocating the benefits must bear a
rational relationship to a permissible government objective. The
Texas plan was not rational, according to the Court, because "the
children who are plaintiffs in these cases 'can affect neither their
parents' conduct, nor their own status."'m1 6
B. Legal Background Applied to "Welfare Reform": Child Exclu-
sion Laws
Current welfare reform efforts,"7 and particularly their em-
phasis on child exclusion laws, which deny additional benefits to a
family when a child is conceived after the family begins to receive
public assistance, run afoul of these Supreme Court holdings. Child
exclusion laws violate the purpose of the welfare state; they also
fail rationality review. These laws currently exist in sixteen states,
all of which obtained a federal waiver for their AFDC pro-
grams."8 The current proposals either eliminate the waiver re-
quirement (as in the Clinton plan), thereby allowing states to
freely implement child exclusion laws,"9 or federalize a child ex-
clusion law (as in the Republican plan), mandating that states
participating in AFDC implement them.
Child exclusion laws "punish dependent children" to deter
"immorality or illegitimacy."'' As has been discussed, the King
court struck down such a scheme, finding it violative of the intent
of the Social Security Act. Child exclusion laws fail rationality
113. Id. at 216-24.
114. Id. at 220.
115. Id. at 223-24.
116. Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
117. See infra part III.
118. See Kevin Ryan, Excluding Welfare Babies, AMERICA, Nov. 18, 1995, at 4.
119. See infra part III.A.
120. See infra part III.B.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 105-09.
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review as well because, like the statute in Plyler, they punish chil-
dren for their parents' conduct, which the children cannot control.
The irrationality of child exclusion laws stems from the fact
that they are based on myth and misconception about welfare
families. The major misconception embodied by the current pro-
posals is that welfare encourages childbirth and illegitimacy in
recipient families. Sociologists and researchers consistently report
that additional welfare dollars do not encourage childbirth. The
Urban Institute, for example, recently concluded that AFDC gen-
erosity does not affect childbearing decisions of young women.2
David Ellwood, a Harvard professor serving in President Clinton's
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), argues that
out-of-wedlock births have increased because marriage declined,
not because pregnancy and childbirth rates have risen."z And in
1994, nearly seventy poverty, labor market, and family structure
researchers joined together to issue a statement which asserted
that focusing on childbearing decisions creates wayward policy. In
their paper, Welfare and Out-of-Wedlock Births: A Research Sum-
mary, the researchers agreed on the following findings:
[T]he best social science research suggests that welfare programs
are not among the primary reasons for the rising numbers of
out-of-wedlock births . . . . [T]he evidence suggests that welfare
has not played a major role in the rise in out-of-wedlock child-
bearing. There is, however, strong evidence that poverty harms
children."
Finally, the most recent sociological study produced findings that
are consistent with the Research Summary. Preliminary reports
issued in 1995 by a Rutgers University group commissioned to
study New Jersey's child exclusion law found no correlation be-
tween welfare recipients' family size and implementation of the
child exclusion law."z These findings demonstrate that the puni-
122. GREGORY Acs, THE URBAN INST., THE IMPACr OF AFDC ON YOUNG
WOMEN'S CHILDBEARING DECISIONS 17 (1993).
123. ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 72.
124. Welfare and Out-of-Wedlock Births, A Research Summary (on file with author).
For media coverage of the joint statement, see Jean Hopfensperger, Welfare Doesn't
Foster Out-of-Wedlock Births, Researchers Declare, STAR-TRIB., June 24, 1994, at SA.
125. See Michael Kramer, The Myth About Welfare Mons, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 21;
Editorial, A Less Patronizing Welfare Debate, WASH. POST, June 23, 1995, at A22; Gary
L. Bauer, Family Cap: Incentive for Welfare Mons, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 17,
1995, at 17D.
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tive measures being proposed today are irrational and therefore
unconstitutional.
Common sense also supports the sociologists' findings. The
fact that grant levels have declined over time' as illegitimacy
has risen"2 indicates that illegitimacy is not encouraged by wel-
fare. Furthermore, if welfare encourages childbirth in general, then
states with the lowest welfare benefits would not consistently have
the largest welfare rolls." Similarly, if the "incentive" of a larg-
er check encourages childbearing, the average welfare family
would be larger than the average non-welfare family; in fact, wel-
fare families have the same number of children as non-welfare
families.129
In addition to being based on inaccurate assumptions, child
exclusion laws are not rationally designed to achieve their own
goals. They are both overinclusive and underinclusive. They are
overinclusive in that they penalize children born to women who
have not acted "irresponsibly" and can control neither the fact of
conception (as in cases of rape, incest, or birth control failure) nor
the possibility of conceiving multiple children at one time. In these
cases, no plausible argument can be made that "irresponsible" be-
havior will be discouraged by denying welfare benefits. Child ex-
clusion laws are also underinclusive in that they do not apply to
men who become fathers while on public assistance themselves or
to men who have children with women on assistance. Primarily
children and their mothers feel the effects of child exclusion laws.
The lack of a rational relationship between child exclusion
laws and their ostensible purposes-discouraging irresponsible
126. See Edin & Jencks, supra note 9, at 204 ("Welfare benefits have always been
low, but their purchasing power has fallen steadily since the mid-1970s. ... ); Ryan,
supra note 118, at 4 ("From 1970 to 1990, the average monthly AFDC benefit level,
adjusted for inflation, declined 36 percent.").
127. See ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 128; Edin & Jencks, supra note 9, at 227; Ryan,
supra note 118, at 4 ("During this same period, the number of female headed households
nearly doubled ... and the extramarital birth rate leaped by two-thirds ... .
128. See Edin & Jencks, supra note 9, at 227-28.
129. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, BASIC FACrS ON WELFARE (on file with author).
According to government data, the typical family receiving AFDC has the same
number of children as the typical non-welfare family - about two children. In
fact, 74% of families receiving AFDC in 1991 had two children or fewer. The
average number of children in an AFDC family has actually dropped 28% since
1969.
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childbirth and promoting self-sufficiency-implies that a different
motivation is influencing the current direction of welfare reform.
This motivation may be prejudice, based on myths and misconcep-
tions about women, welfare, and motherhood, against the current
and growing population receiving AFDC."' A more sympathetic,
though no less harmful, motivation may be a simple misunder-
standing about welfare initiatives of the past and a short institu-
tional memory, as Congress recycles failed ideas and discards long-
standing values regarding child welfare. Whatever the motivation,
however, laws withholding welfare benefits for no legitimate pur-
pose flatly fail constitutional scrutiny.
One decision that arguably supports the constitutionality of
child exclusion laws is Dandridge v. Williams,"' in which the Su-
preme Court rejected a challenge to a Maryland "family cap"
statute. The Court found that policymakers may rationally encour-
age family planning and may attempt to equalize the incomes of
welfare families and wage-earning families, who do not receive an
increase in income corresponding with the birth of a child,132
through the imposition of a family cap.'33
It has been argued that child exclusion laws and family caps
have the same effect-limiting family income-and therefore
should receive the same constitutional treatment. The District
Court of New Jersey took this approach in C.K. v. Shalala," '
stating that "New Jersey's cap merely imposes a ceiling on the
benefits accorded an AFDC household while permitting any addi-
tional child to share in that 'capped' family income.' 13' However,
the C.K. court failed to recognize fundamental differences between
these laws. Family caps set a ceiling on family income; child exclu-
sion laws deny benefit increases based on the status of the child at
conception. The Dandridge decision, therefore, is not applicable to
child exclusion laws. There is a fundamental difference between
keeping every welfare family of any size below a certain level of
130. See Williams, supra note 43, at 740-46; Handler, supra note 18, at 483.
131. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
132. 1d at 483-84, 486. This analysis ignores deductions per child taken by the family
on their income taxes.
133. Id. at 486.
134. 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.NJ. 1995). The N.J. Court of Appeals will hear the plain-
tiffs' appeal of the District Court's summary judgment for the defendant, the State, this
year.
135. Id. at 1013.
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income, as in Dandridge, and punishing "after born" children by
withholding benefits. The Dandridge Court did not consider a law
resulting in a particular child's benefit being taken away. To the
contrary, the Court approached Dandridge as a broad challenge to
capping benefits for all families on welfare at a particular level,
not as a narrow challenge to excluding benefits for additional
children born into a family on welfare.
Child exclusion laws also differ from family caps because in a
state with a family cap, every child born to AFDC parents re-
ceives additional benefits until the cap is reached. Therefore, at
least the second child, and frequently the third and fourth chil-
dren, born into an AFDC family receives additional benefits. Un-
der a child exclusion law, an additional child is deprived of a
benefit increase, even when this child is only the second born.
Thus, economies of scale suggest the hardship would not be as
great under a family cap as under a child exclusion law.
A final distinction between child exclusion laws and family
caps is that under a family cap, the family income level is deter-
mined collectively and does not hinge on when a particular child is
conceived. In contrast, whether or not a newborn receives addi-
tional benefits under a child exclusion law is based not on family
income, but solely on whether that child is conceived before or
after the family went on welfare. Child exclusion laws therefore
openly penalize children based on their status. As discussed above,
the Supreme Court has found this type of scheme to be contrary
to the intent of welfare legislation and potentially unconstitutional.
IM. THE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE: ABANDONING OUR
COMMITMENT TO CHILDREN
Welfare reform is at the top of the national agenda. Wide-
spread agreement exists that the welfare system needs changing,
and this agreement extends in large part to specifics of the pro-
posed reform plans. Remarkable similarities exist between the
Clinton proposal, "The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994,"'36
and the Republican bill, "The Personal Responsibility Act of
1995.2137 The identical emphasis on "responsibility" refers to pro-
visions that will penalize adults on welfare who do not conform to
136. H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
137. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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strict behavioral controls. Although neither bill realistically ad-
dresses poor children's needs, both demonstrate a willingness to
punish poor children indirectly for the behavior of their par-
ents.13
A. Clinton's "Work and Responsibility Act of 1994"
President Clinton's reform initiative, "The Work and Respon-
sibility Act of 1994',139 includes both a work requirement"' and
a full family sanction,' 4' which provides for the elimination of all
family benefits when a parent does not comply with program
guidelines. The Act also permits states to implement child exclu-
sion laws and family caps. There is a time limit in the Clinton
proposal that automatically strips away all AFDC benefits after
two years of federal assistance, regardless of a family's inability to
support itself. 42
The full family sanction is the most egregious violation of
children's rights in the Clinton plan. If a parent refuses to accept
private employment without good cause, or fails three times to
comply with WORKS, the bill's public service provision,43 the
entire family will be removed from any cash assistance or job pro-
gram. This plan deviates from the sanctions imposed by current
law, under which the government may cut a parent's portion of
the grant, but must leave intact that portion of assistance designat-
ed for the family's children.'" The full family sanction blatantly
punishes children based on parental noncompliance.
As discussed in Part II.B of this Note, child exclusion laws
and family caps are additional aspects of the Clinton plan which
punish poor children in order to influence parental behavior. By
eliminating the waiver requirement, which currently prevents states
from unilaterally disregarding the eligibility requirements set out in
138. Incidentally, President Clinton recently vetoed a welfare reform conference agree-
ment passed by Congress, based on his conclusion that it "is tough on children" and "is
at odds with America's values." Statement by President Clinton (Dec. 21, 1995).
139. H.R. 4605, supra note 136.
140. It §§ 201-207.
141. Id § 496(f).
142. Id § 104.
143. Id. § 494.
144. DAVID KASS, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, SUMMARY OF ELEMENTS IN CLINTON
WELFARE REFORM PROPOSAL (1994) (on file with author).
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the Social Security Act,145 the Clinton plan makes such measures
easier to implement, granting states the power to wield reproduc-
tive control over welfare recipients by denying additional benefits
to children born to a family on welfare, or by implementing a per
family grant ceiling.
Clinton's plan flatly contradicts the assertions of his own ad-
ministration that federal waiver requirements are essential to the
welfare of children. In testimony before the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, HHS Assistant Secretary Mary Jo Bane stated, "Both
Secretary Shalala and I understand the importance of our role [in
the waiver process] in ensuring that individuals receiving AFDC,
especially children, are protected from harm." '16 To receive a
waiver, she explained, a state's proposed punitive measures must
be combined with work programs or other available remedies for
people who intend to "[play] by the rules."'47 However, Bane's
statements are contradicted by the Clinton plan to jettison the
waiver safeguards that HHS deemed essential."
The two-year time limit is another inappropriate punitive
policy response in the Clinton plan. Time limits are intended to
minimize long-term welfare reliance, but they are based on inaccu-
rate assumptions about the welfare population. People on welfare
comprise a diverse population in need of assistance for various
reasons. Contrary to popular belief, most people do not remain on
welfare constantly or indefinitely. Instead, many are one-time,
short-time users, while others cycle on and off welfare.'49 Time
limits are premised on the inaccurate notion that people need a
push into the workforce; in fact, people on welfare already strive
to join the workforce, only to find when they do so that they need
145. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
146. AFDC Waiver Demonstration Programs: Necessary Flexibility or Ad Hoc
Decisionmaking?: Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Re-
lations of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 10
(1994) (statement of Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, HHS).
147. Id.
148. The President has justified elimination of the waiver requirement as "based on
[his] belief, as a former governor, that states should be allowed great flexibility." Barbara
Vobejda, Gauging Welfare's Role in Motherhood, WASH. POST, June 2, 1994, at Al, A12.
However, state flexibility is a historic aspect of welfare that has compromised many poor
children's access to assistance, particularly in the South. See supra notes 43-45 and accom-
panying text. Because policymakers rejected local control over AFDC in the 1960s, they
federalized many of the requirements through amendments to the Social Security Act. See
supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
149. See Handler, supra note 27, at 861.
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support, including child care 5 ° and health insurance, 5 ' in order
to stay there. Time limits are also based on the assumption that
they force people to accept employment that they otherwise would
not choose to accept. However, even if this were the case, these
jobs do not promote self-sufficiency. They do not bring a family
out of poverty or adequately support the children in poor families.
The "Help Wanted" signs we might see in the windows of
McDonald's represent the type of jobs that do not provide a sala-
ry sufficient to pay for the child care and health benefits that
working parents require.
B. The Republican "Personal Responsibility Act of 1995"12
The "Personal Responsibility Act of 1995" is even more puni-
tive than the Clinton plan. It entirely prohibits giving welfare
checks to minor mothers, mandates a federal child exclusion
law," cuts spending for welfare programs,55 and enacts "a
tough two-years-and-out provision with work requirements to pro-
mote individual responsibility." '156 Furthermore, children born out
of wedlock are denied assistance permanently.5 7 In terms of in-
direct punishment of children for adult behavior, the Clinton plan
seems almost benign when compared to the stringent initiatives
outlined in the Republican Contract. Although the Republicans'
two-year time limit and work requirement mirror the Clinton plan,
their exclusion of children born out of wedlock and denial of
benefits to teenage mothers go much further in their attempts to
mold parental behavior at any cost to children.
By denying any type of aid to children born out of wedlock,
the Republican plan places the punishment intended for the "irre-
150. The Children's Defense Fund reports that one out of every four mothers aged
21-29 who did not work in 1986 said the reason was a lack of child care. 34% of poor
mothers said the same thing. CILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILD CARE & DEVELOP-
MENT DIVISION, KEY FACTS 6 (1994). A 1991 Illinois study found that 20% of AFDC
recipients returned to welfare within a year because of child care problems. NICOLE 0.
POERSCHE, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, WORKING PARENTS NEED QUALITY CHILD
CARE 4 (n.d.) (on file with author).
151. ELLWOOD, supra note 9, at 238.
152. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
153. H.R 4 § 105(a).
154. HLR. 4 § 106(a).
155. H.RL 4 § 301-303.
156. CONTRACt wrrIH AMERICA, supra note 1, at 10.
157. H.R. 4 § 105(a).
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sponsible" parent squarely upon the child. Withholding assistance
to these children in the guise of "defunding" "immoral" premarital
sex violates one established societal more: the commitment to
assuring that a minimal level of needs is met for all children, re-
gardless of their parents' behavior. 5 ' As discussed earlier, this
commitment has been reinforced by our legislature and by our
courts.
The Republican plan is motivated primarily by an effort to
reduce birth rates among the poor'59 (especially the young and
unwed) and will follow its mandate even if it means breaking up
poor families. Not surprisingly, the return of the orphanage is part
and parcel of the Republican legislation. For example, Representa-
tive Richard Talent has sponsored a bill that gives the savings
from cutting unmarried teens' AFDC benefits to states to build
orphanages." Such a proposal can only be based upon indiffer-
ence to our commitment to the welfare of poor children and to
our nation's recognition that child welfare is not promoted by
removing children from their families.'6 '
Ironically, funding orphanages with savings from AFDC seems
to contradict the basic conservative tenets of "family values" and
small government because institutionalized child care simulta-
neously promotes large government and provides for the breakup
of the nuclear family. 62 The inherent inconsistency in Republican
proposals possibly derives from the conflicting philosophies of
some of the party's thinkers. For example, Charles Murray has in-
fluenced policy with his arguments that the welfare state has
harmed its intended beneficiaries and increased the welfare rolls
by creating dependency.63 Murray's arguments are convenient
158. See supra parts I & 11.
159. The bill summary ("A bill [t]o restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy,
control welfare spending and reduce welfare dependence") belies this purpose. A Con-
gressional Research Service report frankly discusses this issue. The report states that
although the Personal Responsibility Act no longer uses the word "orphanage," "nothing
in H.R. 4, as passed by the House, would limit the ability of the states to use [welfare]
funds to support foster children in residential or group facilities, which are the modem
equivalent of orphanages." KAREN SPAR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WEL-
FARE REFORM: IMPLICATIONS OF H.R. 4 FOR CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 5 (1995).
160. H.R. 4 § 108.
161. See supra part I.A.
162. Conversation with Robert Korstad, Assistant Professor of Public Policy Studies,
Duke University (Spring 1995).
163. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984).
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fodder for budget-minded politicians eager to cut programs, but
have been discredited as based on inaccurate data at best, and, at
worst, based on nothing at all.164 "Murrayism" also contributes to
the trend on the Right to reduce the role of the state, based on
the belief that it can do only harm.'6
Republican social policy is also driven by the conservative
authoritarianism, or "New Paternalism," of Lawrence Mead and
William Bennett.166 "New Paternalism" supports arguments for
direct state interference in the lives of the "deviant." This group
supposedly includes the welfare population, who allegedly differ
from mainstream society in that they lack discipline and will not
adhere to social norms. Combining the philosophies of Murray and
Mead yields the current Republican welfare reform program: a
reduction of monetary assistance and a simultaneous increase in
governmental institutional care.
CONCLUSION: "CODIFYING A POLICY OF NATIONAL CHILD
ABANDONMENT"
The Clinton and Republican proposals trample this nation's
moral and legal commitment to children. As a prominent child
advocate recently said, these bills, with their family caps, full fami-
ly sanctions, and time limits, "destroy the 60-year-old guaranteed
safety net [created by the Social Security Act] for children, women
and poor families .... .""1 The focus on parental behavior elimi-
nates a commitment to children and "codif[ies] a policy of national
child abandonment."'" For example, a mother with one child
who has a second under a family cap or child exclusion law ex-
164. See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR, ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WEL-
FARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 114 (1990)("[W]e can at least
feel confident that our efforts to relieve poverty have not been causing it to grow.");
Jason DeParle, Daring Research or 'Social Science Pornography'?: Charles Murray, N.Y.
TIE MAGAZINE, Oct. 9, 1994, at 48.
165. For examples of this trend and belief, see Lee May, Reagan, Deficit Shapes De-
bate on Social Issues Series: '88 Candidates and the Issues: Social Programs, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1987, at Al.
166. See LAWRENCE N. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHnP (1986). For a discussion of Bennett's views, see Jason DeParle, In Welfare
Debate, It's Now Not 'How?' but 'Why?', N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1994, § 4, at 1 (quoting
Bennett's view that orphanages would be an improvement over the status quo).
167. Marion Wright Edehman, Say No to This Welfare 'Reform" WASH. POST, Nov. 3,
1995, at A23.
168. Id.
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periences approximately an 8% reduction in welfare benefits. Her
income would decline from 57.5% of the federal poverty line to
53.2%.169 If a family cap provision is implemented fully, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services estimates that 2.2 million
children would be denied AFDC benefits. 7 '
This shift from policies that ensure minimal child welfare to
punitive measures intended to control parents' behavior is demon-
strated by the difference in stated goals between AFDC and cur-
rent reform legislation. While AFDC's goals include "encourag[ing]
care of needy children in their own homes," "strengthen[ing] fami-
ly life," and "promot[ing] family self-support," the current bills aim
to "end dependence of needy parents upon government benefits,"
and "discourage out-of-wedlock births.' 171
Proponents of the current reform plans disregard our tradition
of unconditional assistance to children (albeit at a minimal level)
as they promote their ideals of "responsibility." These policy-
makers are willing to sacrifice child welfare in order to attempt to
control parental behavior. The Clinton reform bill and the Repub-
lican "Contract" both purportedly take the moral high ground,
claiming that they must remove parental incentives to act "irre-
sponsibly." But both bills chart a path which violates this country's
historical, moral and judicial commitment to aiding helpless chil-
dren. Full family sanctions, family caps, and child exclusion laws
make for good political rhetoric when Americans face a tremen-
dous budget deficit and middle-class voters have been forced to
tighten their belts. But these policies violate impoverished
children's rights and run counter to the historic evolution of child-
centered welfare policy and welfare initiatives. These policies are
thus wholly unjustifiable.
Sociologists, academics, economists, and policymakers have
suggested alternatives to the rhetoric of responsibility that domi-
nates the wayward plans of President Clinton and the Republicans.
They advocate economic policy to improve job opportunities,. a
169. CARMEN D. SOLOMON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WELFARE RE-
FORM: THE FAMILY CAP 2 (1995).
170. Id. at 4.
171. VEE BURKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CASH WELFARE FOR FAMI-
LIES WITH CHILDREN: COMPARISON OF HOUSE-PASSED H.R. 4 AND SENATE
LEADERSHIP ALTERNATIVES 2 (1995).
172. See generally Edin & Jencks, supra note 9 (arguing that the welfare problem is
not dependence, but lack of jobs); Lynn, supra note 10 (arguing that effective welfare
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meaningful child care guarantee,173 health care reform,74 feder-
ally guaranteed child support, 7 5 and caretaker allowances, 17 6 to
name just a handful. These alternatives approach welfare reform
from the perspective of larger societal issues, rather than simply
imposing hardships on individual children to influence their par-
ents.
Discarding this country's long-standing commitment to child
welfare would further erode the shaky foundation beneath an
entire generation of America's poor children. To do so on the
basis of the rhetoric of responsibility would be fundamentally
irresponsible, immoral, and unconstitutional.
reform needs to take account of labor market problems, rather than push welfare moth-
ers into an already poor labor market).
173. See Collins & Reisman, supra note 84.
174. See Handler, supra note 27, at 866, 868-69.
175. See Minow, supra note 11, at 841.
176. See Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L.
Rrv. 879, 899 (1994).
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